We introduce labelled sequent calculi for quantified modal logics with definite descriptions. We prove that these calculi have the good structural properties of G3-style calculi. In particular, all rules are height-preserving invertible, weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible and cut is admissible. Finally, we show that each calculus gives a proof-theoretic characterization of validity in the corresponding class of models.
Introduction
The proof-theoretic study of propositional modal logics is now a well-developed subject thanks to the introduction of generalizations of Gentzen-style sequent calculi. In particular, we have internal calculi -e.g., hypersequents [5] and nested sequents [2] whose sequents are interpretable in the modal language, and we have external calculi -e.g., display calculi [5] and labelled sequent calculi [19] -whose sequents are not interpretable in the basic modal language. Nevertheless, with the only exception of labelled calculi [6, 17, 19, 21, 20] , the proof-theoretic study of QMLs has remained rather underdeveloped, see [22] for some considerations on hypersequents and display calculi for QMLs. One interesting problem that is still open is that of presenting a satisfactory approach to the structural proof theory for quantified modal logics (QMLs) with definite descriptions: the only cut-free calculi are the Gentzen-style calculi for QMLs with definite descriptionà la Garson [11] that have been presented in [12] .
Starting from our work in [21] , we will introduce labelled calculi for the QMLs with descriptions and λ-abstraction that are studied by Fitting and Mendelsohn [9] . We will show that these calculi have good structural properties -all rules are heightpreserving invertible, weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible, and cut is (syntactically) admissible -and characterize validity in the appropriate semantic classes. In so doing we solve a problem left open in [12] where we read: [Fitting and Mendelsohn's one] is probably the most subtle theory of definite descriptions [. ..] As such it it certainly deserves attention but it is difficult to provide a suitable sequent formalization of it. [p. 388] The rest of this introduction gives a quick introduction to Fitting and Mendelsohn's QMLs with definite descriptions and explains why labelled calculi are the ideal formalism to study their structural proof theory.
I am grateful to Sara Negri for valuable discussion of the ideas and results presented in this paper.
As it is convincingly argued in [9] , the need for non-rigid and non-denoting terms originates from problems already touched upon in the classical works of Frege [10] and Russell [23] . First, as Frege noticed, even if both 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' denote Venus and even if the ancient knew that objects are self-identical, the Babylonians did not know that 'the morning star is identical with the evening star'. Despite this, if we treat definite descriptions as genuine terms, in standard QMLs we can prove that the Babylonians knew it because terms are rigid designators. Moreover, Russell showed that the sentence 'The present king of France is not bald' is ambiguous since it might either mean that the sentence 'the present king of France is bald' is false, or that the present king of France is such that he is non-bald. Given that the expression 'The present king of France' does not actually denote anyone, the first reading is, in fact, true and the second false. If we exclude non-denoting terms, we cannot account for these two readings of our sentence (unless we explain away the term expressing these definite descriptions).
As the two examples above show, if definite descriptions are taken as genuine terms, we must extend the language of QMLs with non-rigid and non-denoting terms, but this extension is not trivial [9] . The problem, roughly, is that if t is a non-rigid or non-denoting term, the formal sentences P t and ¬P t become ambiguous. when it is evaluated in a possible world w of some model, the sentence P t might either mean that there is a world u that is accessible from w and such that the formal sentence P t is true therein, or it might mean that the object denoted by t in w satisfies the unary predicate P is some world v that is accessible from w. Analogously, ¬P t might either mean that it is false that (in w) there is one and only object that is denoted by t and that satisfies P , or it might mean that the one and only object denoted by t (in w) does not satisfy P . For rigid and always denoting terms the two readings are equivalent. For non-rigid and non-denoting terms neither reading entails the other, and, therefore, we need some scoping mechanism to disambiguate the formulas P t and ¬P t. The solution adopted in [9] is that of extending the language with the operator of predicate abstraction λ. The two readings of ○P t (for ○ ∈ { , ¬}) can thus be expressed, respectively, by the (semantically independent) formal sentences:
All in all, Russell's [23] (and Smullyan's [24] ) proposal of explaining away definite descriptions by means of quantification and identity originates from the need to have a scoping mechanism for the formal representation of non-rigid and non-denoting terms. By using the machinery of λ-abstraction we have a scoping mechanism for terms and, therefore, we don't need anymore to explain them away. One essential feature of this approach is that non-rigid and non-denoting terms, such as definite descriptions, can occur in formulas only when they are applied by the operator λ and not as one of the relata of an atomic formula. This is needed because, otherwise, we would have problem in interpreting P t (for t non-rigid) and ¬P t (for t non-denoting).
It is well-known that labelled calculi allows to give well-behaved sequent calculi for all first-order semantically definable propositional modal logic. The key idea is that of extending the language of sequent calculus in order to internalize relational semantics into the syntax: we add world labels (representing worlds) and relational atoms (representing the accessibility relation), and we replace modal formulas with labelled modal formulas (representing truth in a world). This allows to give well-behaved rules for the modalities (that are just like rules for restricted first-order quantifiers). Moreover, thanks to the presence of relational atoms, it allows to use the method of axioms as rules [16, 18] to transform the first-order semantic conditions that define interesting modal logics into rules of the calculus. This can be done directly for geometric semantic conditions (i.e., formulas of shape ∀⃗ x(A ⊃ B), where neither A nor B contains ∀ and ⊃) and indirectly for non-geometric ones (via the method of geometrisation of arbitrary first-order formulas [8] ).
As we will show, the strategy of internalizing the semantics works equally well for QMLs with definite descriptions. In particular, in order to internalize the semantics presented in [9] we will need to add to the labelled language also denotation formulas of shape D(t, x, w) that, when t is a definite description, express the non-trivial fact that t denotes one object in the world w. In this way we can easily define an external calculus for the QMLs with definite descriptions presented in [9] . Even if it is possible to define well-behaved internal calculi for some QMLs without definite descriptions [22] , e.g., by applying the embeddings given in [3, 4] . We believe that labelled calculi provides the best tool for the logics we are considering because it seems hard to define a calculus for them without using denotation formulas or some other extension of the language that cannot be interpreted in the language of modal logic. In a nutshell, the problem is that something like denotation formulas are needed to cope with definite descriptions and the only way to interpret a denotation formula D(t, x, w) in the object language (or to do without something like denotation formulas as in [12, 13] ) is via an identity atom of shape t = x. But, if the modal language allows for formulas of shape t = x with t a definite description, then λ-abstraction looses its role of scoping mechanism and we run into problems with substitutivity of identicals, see [9, Chapter 10.1] , and with cut-elimination for identity atoms [12, Section 5] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the labelled calculi for QMLs presented in [19] . In particular, the language and semantics of standard QMLs are introduced in Section 2.1, and labelled calculi for these logics are outlined in Section 2.2. In Section 3, we introduce QMLs with identity and definite descriptions. We briefly compare different approaches to descriptions (Section 3.1) and we present the syntax and the semantics of the QMLs with definite descriptions presented in [9] (Section 3.2). Then, in Section 4, we introduce labelled calculi for these logics. Section 5 shows that these calculi have the good structural properties that are distinctive of G3-style calculi, and Section 6 shows that they are sound and complete with respect to the appropriate classes of quantified modal frames. We conclude in Section 7 by showing how the present approach can be extended to cover the quantified extensions of all first-order definable propositional modal logics and how it can simulate some other approache to definite descriptions.
Quantified Modal Logics
In this section, we present QMLs based on a varying domain semantics defined over a signature not containing functions of any arity nor the identity symbol, and we present labelled calculi for these logics. Apart from some minor adjustment, the semantics is as in [9, Chap. 4.7] , and the calculi are as in [19, Chap. 12.1] . This section is needed to make the paper self-contained and it might be skipped by readers already familiar with QMLs and labelled calculi.
Syntax and Semantics
Let S be a signature containing, for every n ∈ N, an at most denumerable set REL S of n-ary predicate letters P n 1 , P n 2 , . . . , and let V AR be an infinite set of variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . . The language L is given by the grammar:
where P n ∈ REL S and x, x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ V AR. We use the following metavariables:
• P, Q, R for predicate letters;
• x, y, z for variables;
• p, q, r for atomic formulas;
• A, B, C for formulas.
We follow the standard conventions for parentheses. The formulas ⊺, ¬A and A ⊃⊂ B are defined as expected. The notions of free and bound occurrences of a variable in a formula are the usual ones. Given a formula A, we use A[y x] to denote the formula obtained by replacing each free occurrence of x in A with an occurrence of y, provided that y is free for x in A -i.e., no new occurrence of y is bound by a quantifier.
A model (over the signature S) is a tuple:
where • W ≠ ∅ is a nonempty set of (possible) worlds (to be denoted by w, v, u . . . );
• R ⊆ W × W is a binary accessibility relation between worlds;
• D ∶ W → 2 D is a function mapping each world to a possibly empty set of objects D w (its domain), where D W = ⋃ w∈W D w is nonempty and disjoint from W;
• V ∶ S ×W → 2 (D W ) n is a valuation function mapping, at each world w, each n-ary predicate P (∈ S) to a subset of (D W ) n .
A frame F is a triple ⟨W, R, D⟩ (i.e. it is a model without valuation), and a model M is based on a frame F if M = ⟨F , V⟩. We will say that a frame ⟨W, R, D⟩ has:
Given a model M = ⟨W, R, D, V⟩, an assignment (over M ) is a function σ ∶ V AR → D W mapping each variable x to an element of the union of the domains of the model. Moreover, for o ∈ D, σ x▷o denotes the assignment behaving like σ save for x that is mapped to the object o. Labelled calculi for quantified modal logics with definite descriptions 5 
The notions of truth in a world w of a model (⊧ M w A), truth in a model (⊧ M A), and validity in a (class of ) frames (F (∈ C) ⊧ A) are defined as usual.
As it is well known, some notable formulas are valid in classes of frames defined by properties of the accessibility relation and/or of the domains. In particular, Table 1 presents some well-known (geometric) propositional correspondence results as well as correspondence results for increasing, decreasing and constant domain frames. By an L -logic Q.L we mean the set of all L -formulas that are valid in a class of frames. We use standard names for L -logics -e.g., Q.K stands for the set of Lformulas valid in the class of all frames, and Q.S4⊕CBF/BF/UI stands for the set of L -formulas valid in the class of all reflexive and transitive frames with increasing/decreasing/constant domain. We say that M is a model for Q.L whenever M is based on a frame in the class that defines Q.L.
Labelled Sequent Calculi
Labelled sequent calculi for L -logics have been introduced in [19, Chapter 12.1]. These calculi are based on extending the modal language in order to internalize the semantics of QMLs. First of all, we introduce a set LAB of fresh variables, called labels. Labels will be denoted by w, v, u, . . . and will be used to represent worlds. Then, we extend the set of formulas by adding atomic formulas of shape x ∈ wexpressing that (the object assigned to) x is in the domain of quantification of (the world represented by) w -and of shape wRv -expressing that v is accessible from w. Lastly, we replace each L -formula A with the labelled formula w ∶ A -expressing that A holds at w. A labelled sequent is an expression:
where Γ is a multiset composed of labelled formulas and of atomic formulas of shape x ∈ w or wRv, and where ∆ is a multiset of labelled formulas. Given a formula E of this extended language, E[w v] is the formula obtained by substituting each occurrence of v in E with an occurrence of w. Substitution of variables is extended to formulas of the extended language as expected, and both kinds of substitution are extended to sequents by applying them componentwise.
The rules of the calculus G3Q.K, for the minimal L -logic Q.K, are given in Table  2 . For each logic Q.L extending Q.K, the calculus G3Q.L is obtained by extending G3Q.K with the non-logical rules of Table 3 that express proof-theoretically the geometric semantic properties which define Q.L (cf. A G3Q.L-derivation of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is a tree of sequents, whose leaves are initial sequents, whose root is Γ ⇒ ∆, and which grows according to the rules of G3Q.L. As usual, we consider only derivations of pure sequents -i.e., sequents where no variable has both free and bound occurrences. The height of a G3Q.L-derivation is the number of nodes of its longest branch. We say that Γ ⇒ ∆ is G3Q.L-derivable (with height n), and we write G3Q.L ⊢ (n) Γ ⇒ ∆, if there is a G3Q.L-derivation (of height at most n) of Γ ⇒ ∆ or of an alphabetic variant of Γ ⇒ ∆. A rule is said to be (height-preserving) admissible in G3Q.L, if, whenever its premisses are G3Q.Lderivable (with height at most n), also its conclusion is G3Q.L-derivable (with height at most n). In each rule depicted in Tables 2 and 3 , Γ and ∆ are called contexts, the formulas occurring in the conclusion are called principal, and the formulas occurring in the premisses only are called active.
The following proposition presents the main meta-theoretical properties of G3Q.L. The proofs can be found in [19, Chap. 12.1] .
is obtained from Γ (∆) by renaming bound variables. 3 . The following rules of substitution are height-preserving admissible in G3Q.L:
where y is free for x in each formula occurring in Γ, ∆ for rule [y x]. 4 . The following rules of weakening are height-preserving admissible in G3Q.L: Table 3 : Non-logical rules
Each rule of G3Q.L is height-preserving invertible. 6 . The following rules of contraction are height-preserving admissible in G3Q.L:
The following rule of Cut is admissible in G3Q.L:
L is sound and complete with respect to Q.L.
3 Quantified modal logics with definite descriptions
Preliminary discussion
Before introducing the formal machinery used by Fitting and Mendelshon [9] to deal with definite descriptions, we take a minute to outline some of the main semantic approaches to definite descriptions, see [12, 13] for more details. Given a formula with one free variable A(x), let us consider the description:
First of all, we can simply deny that (3.1) has to be represented by a genuine term of the formal language. In this case, following Russell [23] , we can explain it away by means of of quantification and identity as follows:
This is a very simple solution in that we simply get rid of the problem of giving a semantics for improper definite descriptions.
If, instead, following Frege [10] we maintain that (3.1) has to be represented by a genuine term of the formal language, we extend the language with terms of shape:
and we have to give a satisfactory semantics for descriptions. If a description is proper, then it denotes the one and only existing object that satisfies it (in a given world).
The problem is what to do when a description is improper because either it is true of no object -e.g., ι
x(x ≠ x) -or it is true of more than one object -e.g., ι
x(x = x). If we don't want to extend the language then we cannot allow for non-denoting terms. Thus, we have to accept that improper descriptions denote some object. In a constant domain setting -i.e., when we use the quantification theory of classical logic -we can follow Montague and Kalish [15] and assume that all improper descriptions denote a chosen object. If, instead, we are using a varying domain semantics -i.e., the quantification theory of positive free logic -then we can follow Garson [11] and assume that each improper description denotes a non-existing object (without thereby assuming it is the same one for all improper descriptions). Nevertheless, these two solutions are not satisfactory in that it is more natural to maintain that an improper description simply fails to denote. Moreover, like Russell's approach, they do not disentangle designation from existence.
The addition of λ-abstraction to the language allows Fitting and Mendelsohn [9] to avoid these shortcomings: proper descriptions denote the one and only object that satisfies them (be it an existing object or not) and improper descriptions simply fails to denote. Failure of denotation will not be a problem because definite descriptions do not occur as relata of atomic formulas, but only as terms applied via λ. Hence we can simply impose that if t is an improper description then λxA.t is false: this implies that ¬(λxA.t) is true -i.e., that the sentence At is false -without thereby implying that λx¬A.t is true -i.e., that the negation of A is true of the object denoted by t.
Syntax and semantics
Let us consider the same signature S of Section 2.1 (functions of any arity are omitted for simplicity). The sets of terms and formulas of the language L λ are defined simultaneously as follows:
where P n ∈ REL S and x, x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ V AR. Observe that definite descriptions can occur in a formula only as terms applied by the operator λ. We continue to use the conventions and notions introduced in Section 2.1 with the following additions:
• in λxA.t all occurrences of x (save for the displayed t in case t ≡ x) are bound by λx;
• t, r, s range over terms.
Frames, models and assignments are defined as in Section 2.1. Because of definite descriptions, we have to define the notions of denotation and satisfaction together. • Denotation of a term t:
iff o is the one and only member of D W such that σ x▷o ⊧ M w A • Satisfaction is defined by extending Definition 2.1 with the following clauses:
Truth and validity are defined as in Section 2. 
where ∃! is the unique existential quantifier, ∨ is exclusive disjunction and U is a constant monadic predicate axiomatized by ∀y(U (y) ⊃ ∃z(y = z)) and ∀z(U (y) ∧ U (z) ⊃ y = z) (our language does not contain contants). [11] description can be defined as:
A Garson-style
ι g xA ≡ ι x(∃!y(A[y x]) ∨ U ι xA (x)) where U ι xA is a constant predicate, that is parametric on ι xA (modulo alphabetic variants), such that ∀z(U ι xA (y) ∧ z = y ⊃ ) and U ι xA (z) ∧ U ι xA (y) ⊃ z = y.
Labelled calculi
In order to introduce labelled sequent calculi for QMLs with definite descriptions, we extend the language of labelled calculi with denotation formulas of shape D(t, x, w), which will be used to express that the variable x denotes the object denoted in w by the term t. From now on, a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is an expression where Γ is a multiset of labelled L λ -formulas and of formulas of shape D(t, x, w), x ∈ w or wRv; and ∆ is a multiset of labelled L λ -formulas and of denotation formulas only. The following non-standard definition of weight will be essential in Sections 5 and 6. • The weight of a term t is 0 if t is a variable and, if t ≡ ι xA, it is equal to the weight of w ∶ ι xA;
• The weight of a labelled L λ -formula w ∶ A is defined as the number of operators that differs from (and =) occurring in A plus the weight of each occurrence of a term in A;
• The weight of a formula D(t, x, w) is equal to the weight of the term t;
• the weight of formulas of shape x ∈ w and wRv is 0.
The rules of the calculus G3Qλ.L are the rules of G3Q.L, see Tables 2 and 3 , plus the initial sequents and rules given in Table 4 . Observe that the rules for identity contain the labelled version of the non-logical rules first introduced in [18] . When w ∶ y = x holds, by Repl we can replace x with y in any atomic formula that, so to say, talks about w. Rule RigV ar implies that if x and y denote the same object in some world, they do so in each world. Thus, variables behave as rigid designators and labels could be omitted from identities. We choose to keep them in order to have a more uniform notation.
The satisfaction clause for λx.A.t in a world w is similar to that for ∃xA, the only difference being that A has to be satisfied not by some arbitrary object of D w , but by the one and only object of D W that is denoted by t in that world of that model. Therefore the rules for λ are like the ones for ∃ in intuitionistic logic with existence predicate, see [1, 25] , save that they are restricted by formulas of shape D(t, x, w) instead of by atoms of shape Et.
Next, we briefly expalin the rules for D(t, x, w). The universal rule DenId ensures that if y in w picks the object denoted by x, then x and y denote the same object; and the universal rule DenV ar ensures that variables denote at every world. The rules LD i and RD are obtained as meaning-explanation of the denotation clause for definite descriptions. This is done by first rewriting the denotation clause for ι x 1 A as: Rules for identity:
Then, from the left-to-right (right-to-left) direction of this semantic clause we easily obtain the rules LD i (RD). As shown in [14] , for intuitionistic logic with existence predicate it is possible to obtain a simpler calculus by replacing the two premisses rule
The same phenomenon holds form QMLs with varying domains where we can use either two-premisses versions of rules R∃ and L∀ [12] or the simpler one-premiss versions thereof [19] . In Table 2 we have used the one-premiss rules and the same has been done for the rule Rλ in [21] . Here, instead, we are forced to adopt the two-premisses version of the rule Rλ (and of LD 2 ) because the presence of definite description impairs the admissiblity of cut with the one-premiss version of this rule. The problem, roughly, is that D( ι x 1 A, x 2 , w) (or w ∶ A[y x 1 ] for rule LD 2 ) is not atomic and, therefore, cannot be a principal formula of the rule.
Structural properties
Lemma 5.1 (Initial sequents) Let A be an arbitrary L λ -formula. Sequents of the following shapes are G3Qλ.L-derivable:
Proof. The two cases are proved by simultaneous induction on the weight of the principal formula. For the inductive steps it is enough to apply, root first, the rules for the outermost operator (D included) of the principal formula and then the inductive hypothesis (IH). To illustrate, for D( ι yA, z, w), Γ ⇒ ∆, D( ι yA, z, w) we have: 
where y is free for x in each formula occurring in Γ, ∆ for rule [y x].
Proof. Both proofs are by induction on the height of the derivation D of the premiss Γ ⇒ ∆. The base cases and the inductive steps where the last rule is not a rule from Table 4 are proved in [19, Lemma 12.4] .
We consider explicitly only he case of rule [y x] where the last step is by Lλ and the substitution [y x] clashes with its variable condition. E.g., the last step of D is
Lλ with x occurring free in w ∶ A[y z], Γ ′ , ∆ and/or t ≡ x. We apply IH twice to the premiss of the last step of D, the first time to replace y with y ′ , for some fresh variable y ′ , and the second time to replace x with y. We finish by applying rule Lλ.
Thus, assuming z ≡ x, we have transformed D into D[y x]:
Lλ which has the same height as D because the steps by IH are height-preserving admissible and the step by ⋆ is an height-preserving admissible rewriting that is feasible because z ≡ x and y ′ ∈ {y, x}.
Theorem 5.4 (Weakening) The following rules are height-preserving admissible in G3Qλ.L:
The proofs are by induction on the height of the derivation D of the premiss Γ ⇒ ∆. The base cases and the inductive cases where the last step of D is not by a rule from Table 4 are proved in [19, Thm. 12.5] . The proofs of the inductive cases when the last step of D is by Lλ or by RD (Rλ or LD i ) are analogous to the ones in [19, Thm. 12.5] with last step of D by rule L∃ (R∃, respectively). The remaining cases are similar to the other ones by geometric rules and can be omitted. Let's consider RD. Suppose we have a G3Qλ.L-derivation D of height n of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, D( ι xA, z, w). If n = 0 or if D( ι xA, z, w) is principal in the last step of D, the lemma holds trivially. Else we reason by cases on the last step R of D and we transform the derivation(s) of its premiss(es) Γ i ⇒ ∆ i , D( ι xA, z, w) (i ∈ {1, 2}) as follows: first, if R has a variable condition, we apply an hp-admissible instance of substitution to ensure it differs from y; then we apply the inductive hypothesis to obtain either
finally we apply an instance of R.
Rule Lλ can be treated analogously. 
The proof is handled by a simultaneous induction on the height of the derivations of the premisses of LC and RC. Without loss of generality, we assume the multiset we are contracting is made of only one formula E.
The base cases obviously hold, and the inductive cases depend on whether zero, one, or two instances of E are principal in the last step R of the derivation D of the premiss. If zero instances are principal in R, we apply IH to the premiss(es) of R and then an instance of rule R, and we are done.
If one instance is principal and R is by a propositional rule or by one of R∀, L∃, R◻, L , Lλ and RD, we proceed by first applying invertibility to that rule, then we apply IH as many times as needed, and we conclude by applying an instance of that rule. If, instead, one instance is principal and R is by a rule with repetition of the principal formula(s) in the premiss, we use the hp-admissibility of the rules of weakening, then IH and R.
If two instances are principal, R is a geometric rule and, if needed, we make use of the fact that R satisfies the closure condition (see [19, p. 100]). To illustrate, the case of Euclid is taken care by the presence of its contracted instances Euclid c . For T rans, we have three occurences of wRw in the premiss of this rule instances: two principal and one active. We apply IH twice and we are done. For Repl, the active formula of the last rule instance must be of shape w ∶ x = x, and, after having applied IH, we can get rid of it by applying Ref =
Theorem 5.8 (Cut) The following rules of Cut are admissible in G3Q.L:
We prove the two cases simultaneously. The proof, which extends that of [19, Thm. 12.9] , considers an uppermost instance of either Cut or Cut ′ which is handled by a principal induction on the weight of the cut-formula with a sub-induction on the sum of the heights of the derivations D 1 and D 2 of the two premisses of cut (cut-height, for shortness). The proof can be organized in four exhaustive cases: in case 1 one of the two premisses is an initial sequent. In case 2 the cut formula is not principal in the left premiss only and in case 3 it is not principal in the right premiss. Finally, in case 4, the cut formula is principal in both premisses.
In case 1, the conclusion of Cut (Cut ′ ) is an initial sequent and, therefore, we can dispense with that instance of Cut (Cut ′ ).
In case 2, we transform the derivation as follows. First, if the last rule applied in D 1 has a variable condition, we apply an height-preserving admissible substitution to rename its eigenvariable with a fresh one. Then, we apply one instance of Cut (Cut ′ ) on each premiss of D 1 with the conclusion of D 2 . These instances of Cut (Cut ′ ) are admissible by IH because they have a lesser cut-height. We finish by applying an instance of the last rule applied in D 1 .
Case 3 is similar to case 2. To illustrate, suppose the last step of D 2 is by Lλ (with y eigenvariable), we transform
In case 4, we have subcases according to the principal operator of the cut-formula. We consider only the case where the cut-formula is of shape w ∶ λyB.t or D( ι xA, z, w) (see [19, Thm. 12.9] for the other cases).
• Cut formula is w ∶ λyB.t. We transform
where D 3 is the following derivation: • Cut formula is D( ι xA, z, w).
-If right premise is by LD 1 , we have:
and we transform it into:
where Cut ′ 1 has lesser cut-height and Cut 2 has a cut formula of lower weight. -if the right premise by LD 2 , we have:
we transform it into:
where D 3 is the following derivation:
Cut ′ 1 and Cut ′ 3 are admissible because they have lesser cut-height; Cut 2 and Cut 4 because their cut-formula has lower weight. 
The following rules of replacement are admissible in G3Qλ.L:
Proof. The proofs of items 1 and 2(a) are left to the reader. We prove cases 2(b) and 2(c) by simultaneous induction on the weight of the 'replacement formula'. All cases but that of 2(b) with A of shape λx 1 B.t and that of 2(c) with t of shape ι x 2 B are left to the reader. In the first case, assuming, w.l.o.g., x 1 ∈ {x, y, z}, we have:
Where the step by ⋆ is a rewriting that is feasible because {x 1 , x 2 } ∩ {x, y, z} = ∅, and the step by IH 2(c) (b) is by induction on case (c)/(b) of the lemma, respectively.
In the second case, assuming {x 1 , x 2 } ∩ {x, y, z} = ∅, we have:
where the derivation D 2 is as follows:
Where all the steps marked with ⋆ are syntactic rewritings that are feasible because {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } ∩ {x, z, y} = ∅, and the admissibility of Sym = follows from Lemma 5.9.1.
Finally, item (3) follows from item (2) thanks to the admissibility of Cut and Contraction, as it is shown by the following derivation for Repl 1 (the case of Repl 2 uses Cut ′ and Lemma 5. 9.2(c) , and the proof proceeds in the same way):
If y is new to z and to A, then the L λ -formula:
is G3Qλ.L-derivable (see [9, Section 12.5 ] for a discussion of this formula). 
if t ≡ y; Given a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ we say that it is Qλ Proof. The proof is by induction on the height of the G3Qλ.L-derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆. The base case holds since Γ and ∆ have one formula in common, and it is easy to see that the propositional rules, the rules for ∀, and the rules for ◻ preserve validity on every model, see [19, Thm. 12.13] .
For rule Lλ, let the last step of D be: For rule Rλ, let the last step of D be: Hence, we know that M, f satisfies w ∶ A[x 2 x 1 ] and, by IH, we conclude that it satisfies also some formula in ∆.
For rule LD 2 , we proceed as for LD 1 . If the last step of D is:
and if M, f is a pair that satisfies D( ι x 1 A, x 2 , w), then we know that (6.1) holds. Assume that M, f satisfies also all formulas in Γ. By IH, the left premise entails that if that pair does not satisfy some formula in ∆ then it satisfies w ∶ A[y x 1 ] and, hence f x▷f (y) ⊧ M f (w) A. But then (6.1) entails that f (y) = f (x 2 ) -i.e., M, f satisfies also w ∶ x 2 = y . By induction on the right premiss we conclude that the pair under consideration satisfies some formula in ∆.
For rule RD, let the last step of D be:
Let M, f satisfy all formulas in Γ. If it also satisfies some formula in ∆ we are done. Else, by IH, we know it satisfies w ∶ A[x 2 x 1 ]. Let o be any object such that f x1▷o ⊧ M f (w) A. We consider a pair M, f ′ where M is as before and f ′ is like f save that f ′ (z) = o. Thanks to the variable condition on z, this implies that M, f ′ satisfies w ∶ x 2 = z. Hence, M, f ′ satisfies D( ι x 1 A, x 2 , w). We conclude the same holds for M, f .
The rules for identity preserves validity on every model: the proof is standard for rules Ref = and Repl. For rule RigV ar it depends on the fact that variables are rigid designators. Also the rules DenV ar and DenId preserves validity on every model. For DenV ar this depends on the fact that variables denote in every world. For DenId, this holds because the fact that M satisfies D(x, y, w) under f means that f (x) = f (y). Therefore, M must also satisfy under f the formula w ∶ x = y.
For the proof that each non-logical rule from Table 3 preserves validity over the appropriate class of frames, we refer the reader to [19, Thm. 12.13 ]. Proof. The proof is organized in four main steps. First, in Def. 6.4 , we sketch a root-first G3Qλ.L-proof-search procedure. Second, in Def. 6 .5, we define the notion of saturation for a branch of a G3Qλ.L-proof-search tree and, in Proposition 6.6, we show that, for every sequent, a G3Qλ.L-proof-search either gives us a G3Qλ.Lderivation of that sequent, or it has a saturated branch. Third, in Def. 6.8 , we define a model M B out of a saturated branch B. Finally, in Lemma 6.9, we prove that M B is a model for Qλ.L that falsifies Γ ⇒ ∆. Definition 6.4 A G3Qλ.L-proof-search tree for a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is a tree of sequents generated according to the following inductive procedure. At step 0 we write the one node tree Γ ⇒ ∆. At step n + 1, if all leaves of the tree generated at step n are initial sequents, the procedure ends. Else, we continue the bottom-up construction by applying, to each leaf that is not an initial sequent, each applicable instance of a rule of G3Qλ.L (by invertibility of the rules, there is no prescribed order in which thee rules need to be applied) or, if no rule instance is applicable, we copy the leaf on top of itself. For rules Ref = , Ref W , Ser, Cons and DenVar, we consider applicable only instances where, save for eigenvariables, all terms and labels occurring in the active formula of that instance already occur in the leaf. See [19, Thm. 12.14] for the details of the inductive procedure (the reader might easily fill the missing details). Definition 6.5 (Saturation) A branch B of a G3Qλ.L-proof-search tree for a sequent is QλL-saturated if it satisfies the following conditions, where Γ (∆) is the union of the antecedents (succedents) occurring in that branch,
Completeness

